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Abstract
Most studies on Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) focus on the impact of their expansion
through inward or outward foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. However, divestments are
quite common among the operations of MNEs. In order to derive their effects, we build a
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that includes two non-standard characteristics:
the presence of MNEs and unemployment. The model is applied to the Spanish economy,
where FDI inflows have surpassed divestments at the aggregate level in the period 2005-2009,
although divestments have been sizeable in ten sectors. We analyse two different scenarios: 1)
divestments that involve the closure of plants of foreign affiliates and 2) divestments where
national firms buy the plant of foreign affiliates. The model allows estimating the overall
impact of the divestments occurring simultaneously in ten sectors and in particular sectors.
Results not only show that national acquisitions are less harmful than closures, but quantify
those effects, and provide information on the role of the divesting sector. Some adjustment
costs arise in all scenarios.
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1 Introduction 
Most studies on Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) focus on the impact of their 
expansion through inward or outward foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, and 
foreign outsourcing or offshoring. Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004) and 
Feenstra (2010) present a review of their theoretical and empirical effects on host 
and home countries. However, MNE divestments are common operations: “[They] 
affect between one quarter and four fifths of all FDI projects” (UNCTAD 2009: 8). 
This phenomenon becomes more important in times of crisis and high 
unemployment (UNCTAD 2012: 62–63), but is not limited to those times. Bernard 
and Jensen (2007) point out the abundance of plant shutdowns across 
manufacturing firms in the US, of which MNEs account for around one fifth of 
subsequent employment destruction. Ibarra-Caton (2012) shows that US 
manufacturing plants of foreign MNEs are more likely to shut down than non-
MNE plants (although less likely to shut down than US-owned MNE plants). 
Thus, it seems that divestments are an important side of the operations of MNEs, 
although the evidence in the literature is scant. 
Boddewyn (1983) suggests that divestment can be treated as the reverse 
process of FDI under certain circumstances. When the advantages of 
internalisation or location cease for MNEs, the absence of barriers to exit may 
favour divestments. This transitory nature of FDI in advanced economies could 
well explain divestments as long as the emerging and transition economies become 
more attractive for MNEs (e.g. because of lower labour costs and EU 
membership). In 2010, developing and transition economies attracted half of 
worldwide FDI inflows (UNCTAD 2011). UNCTAD itself regards this as a record 
figure, since these countries used to receive around one third of the world’s FDI 
inflows. China explains most of this trend because it is the top destination of FDI 
flows. However, in 2010 there were already ten developing and transition 
economies among the top 20 recipients of inward FDI. In contrast, developed 
economies have undergone divestment processes, particularly Japan and some 
European countries (UNCTAD 2011 and 2012).  
The consequences of divestment on employment volatility are not clear, as 
stated by Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004). There may be two reasons why 
employment could have a different degree of volatility in MNEs than in national 
firms. Firstly, MNEs have a different degree of exposure to international shocks 
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than national firms. MNEs are more sensitive to technological and price shocks, 
which would shift their downward-sloping labour demand schedules. Secondly, 
MNEs have lower costs of relocation than national firms because they operate with 
several plants (e.g. when a change in the home wage rate takes place, the elasticity 
of labour demand can be higher for MNEs than for national firms). The theoretical 
effect of MNEs on employment volatility is ambiguous and depends on several 
factors: a complementarity or substitutability relationship between employment in 
the host country and factors of production in other locations, commitment to local 
institutions, labour and product elasticities of demand and production factor 
intensities, etc. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence shows that when a demand 
shock takes place, MNEs adjust their employment quicker than national firms, 
although they are more likely to retain their employees (see, for example, Görg 
and Strobl 2003; Barba Navaretti et al. 2003).  
The lack of a clear theoretical framework for model divestment makes it 
suitable for simulation models to test plausible scenarios. For this reason, we 
analyse the case of Spain, a developed economy that has been heavily affected by 
the financial crisis and experienced a huge increase in unemployment rate (from 
8% in 2007 to 26% in 2013). Total FDI net inward flows have been positive in 
Spain (i.e., the entry of FDI surpasses FDI divestments). However, in some sectors 
divestments have been greater than the entry of FDI flows. We use a simulation 
model – a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model – which allows us to 
follow the differential impact of divestments depending on the sector in which 
they occur. We also estimate the effects of all simultaneous divestments for the 
economy as a whole. This CGE model is one of the few that accounts for the 
operations of MNEs. It is further extended to include unemployment, a feature that 
to the best of our knowledge has not yet been included in any of the CGEs with 
MNEs (see Latorre 2009, for a review). Unemployment effects seem crucial for 
the analysis of divestments. We further have developed a social accounting matrix 
(SAM) for the Spanish economy for the year 2005. This database has been 
completed with FDI and MNE Spanish data. 
The present paper is organised as follows. The next section includes 
worldwide evidence on the recent trends of the operations of MNEs. Section 3 
focuses on the description of the divestments that have taken place in Spain from 
2005 onwards. Section 4 explains the CGE model for multinationals, while section 
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5 discusses the main results. Section 6 presents a sensitivity analysis. The 
conclusions appear in the last section.  
2 Worldwide Evidence on MNEs Employment 
OECD (2012a) provides data on the MNE employment across various OECD 
member countries, summarised in Table 1. The data refer to the activities of MNEs 
in all manufacturing sectors (data on the primary sector and services are poorer 
and have not been included). The first two columns show the number of 
employees in MNEs in 2001 and 2007. The third column gives the percentage 
variation in the number of employees between those two years.  Countries are 
ordered in the table according to this percentage variation.  
The countries that have experienced sizeable increases in the number of MNE 
employees are at the top of Table 1. Most Eastern European countries are in this 
group. However, there are advanced economies as well, such as Denmark, 
Switzerland and Austria. A second group of countries experienced modest 
increases in MNE employment. Finally, countries which experienced MNE 
employment reductions are at the bottom of the table. Such reductions were 
sizeable in Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Italy, United States and France. One 
hypothesis is that these losses in employment could be due to technological 
progress. Advances in technology taking place within a MNE, on the whole, tend 
to be available to different countries. However, these data show that employment 
grew in some countries but declined in others. It seems that other factors must be 
at play (e.g. cost savings and EU membership) when deciding whether or not to 
hire more workers in a particular country. For example, the relatively expensive 
low-skilled manufacturing employees in advanced countries have decreased in 
number and a plausible explanation is the offshoring process in emerging 
economies (see, for example, Feenstra (2010) and Yamashita (2010), for a 
description of the US and Japanese cases). The effect of investment creation and 
diversion when transition economies enter the EU also seems plausible according 
to Table 1: MNE employment increased in new EU entrants, such as Poland, 
Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary and Slovenia, whereas it decreased in 
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Table 1: MNEs and employees in manufacturing sectors (2001–2007) 
  No employees in MNEs Share of MNEs in Manufacturing 
  2001 2007 % 2001-7 2001 2007 Difference 2001-7 
Sizeable Increases   
Poland 386003 658021 70.5 21.9 32.5 10.6 
Czech Republic  362423 564543 55.8 28.9 45.5 16.6 
Denmark 65800 83006 26.1 14.1 22.6 8.5 
Slovak Republic* 143482 180019 25.5 34.9 43.8 8.9 
Hungary* 230402 287296 24.7 27.1 36.9 9.8 
Switzerland* 119025 145345 22.1 11.6 13.6 2 
Estonia* 41078 49333 20.1 38.4 45 6.6 
Slovenia* 37129 42977 15.8 15.9 18.7 2.8 
Austria* n.a. 179141 n.a. 24 29.1 5.1 
Small increases   
Germany* 1086000 1144000 5.3 14.8 16.5 1.7 
Luxembourg* 13800 14400 4.3 41.7 44.3 2.6 
Israel  44412 46402 4.5 n.a. n.a. 1.6 
Belgium* n.a. n.a. n.a. 32.3 34.8 2.5 
Finland  73450 74169 1.0 17.2 19.2 2 
Decreases   
Ireland 123186 102439 -16.8 49.2 46 -3.2 
Netherlands* 210116 176445 -16.0 21 24.3 3.3 
Norway  70388 60944 -13.4 24.3 22.4 -1.9 
Italy 520749 456987 -12.2 10.8 10.1 -0.7 
United States* 2330200 2050700 -12.0 11.1 11.3 0.2 
France* 1043400 938151 -10.1 26.4 26.1 -0.3 
Spain 408579 386041 -5.5 16.4 16.1 -0.3 
United Kingdom 906237 859110 -5.2 24 30.4 6.4 
Sweden 232579 221744 -4.7 32.7 33.4 0.7 
Portugal* 108366 108046 -0.3 12.8 13.3 0.5 
Source: OECD (2012a). Note: For countries with an asterisk, the data on MNEs exhibit breaks in the 
series yielding a shorter time series. The periods for which data are available are 2003–2006 for 
Slovak Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia and Portugal; 2002–2007 for Austria and France; 
2002–2005 for the Netherlands and Israel; 2001–2005 for Luxembourg, 2002–2006 for Belgium and 
Germany; 2001–2006 for the US and 2003–2007 for Switzerland. 
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former EU member countries, such as the Netherlands, Italy, France, UK, Spain 
and Portugal. Baldwin et al. (1996) and Bajo-Rubio and López-Pueyo (2002), for 
example, examine this relationship between FDI and economic integration. 
The evolution in the number of employees in MNEs can be compared with the 
same variable in national firms. This is shown in the next three columns in Table 
1. They display the share of employees in MNEs with respect to total employees in 
manufacturing. All the countries that increased the number of employees in MNEs 
also experienced an increase in their share of MNEs. This implies that MNEs 
created more employment than national firms.  
There are different trends among the countries that reduced employment in 
MNEs. On the one hand, Ireland, Norway, Italy and France decreased the share of 
MNEs in total employment. On the other hand, that share increased in the 
Netherlands, the US, United Kingdom, Sweden and Portugal.  
These changes in employment suggest that MNEs can play a key role in 
employment creation or destruction in OECD countries. We focus on the case of 
Spain, where aggregate employment creation had been sizable before the crisis. 
The Spanish Economically Active Population Survey shows a 29.1% growth in the 
number of employees and self-employed for the period 2001–2007 for the 
economy as a whole.   
3 Divestments in the Spanish Economy 
For decades Spain has been an attractive country for the activities of MNEs (Bajo-
Rubio and López-Pueyo 2002). However, as explained in the Introduction, FDI 
projects can be affected by divestments. Myro et al. (2008) provide a wide ranging 
overview of divestment processes in manufacturing in Spain. 
MNEs account for an important share in manufacturing: around 16% of their 
employees (Table 1). This is also the case in services, with 7% in production in 
2005 and nearly 10% in 2009 (INE 2013a; Eurostat 2013; OECD 2012b). Spain 
experienced an important boom in FDI inflows before joining the European 
Community in 1986. It also became an important source of FDI outward flows 
(Guillén 2005; Guillén and García-Canal 2010), with world leading MNEs in 
services (Santander, BBVA, Telefónica, etc.), infrastructure (e.g. Grupo Ferrovial 
and ACS), energy (Repsol and Iberdrola) and clothing (Zara, Mango, etc.). 
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According to the World Investment Report, Spain has been among the top ten 
largest sources and recipients of FDI in the world in the past few years.  
The Spanish Registry of FDI (Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness 
2013) has a dataset which enables the analysis of the movements of inward and 
outward FDI. This source therefore allows us to estimate divestment flows. A 
caveat on the use of divestments data is how to avoid including operations that are 
not strictly related to reductions in production or employment. For example, this is 
the case for reverse intra-company loans, or the repayments of debts to the parent 
company. These cases appear in many sources as a divestment, but the Spanish 
Registry of FDI data allows disentangling them from the sectoral data on 
transmissions to other owners (e.g. a national acquisition of a foreign plant), and 
from partial and total closures. Unfortunately, this information is usually not 
available at sectoral level from other sources, such as the OECD, UNCTAD and 
Eurostat. 
A related issue is how to measure the level of foreign capital stock or “net FDI 
position”. The series on FDI from the Spanish Registry of FDI gives the equity 
capital component at sectoral level. This contrasts with the information from other 
institutions, such as the Bank of Spain, Eurostat and the OECD that do not permit 
the extraction of the equity capital component at sectoral level. In this study, we 
concentrate on divestments proxied by the impact of reductions in equity capital 
(excluding reinvested earnings and other capital). We take as reference for our 
model the FDI position in 2005, for the sake of coherence with the rest of the 
dataset (see Section 4.8).  
Table 2 summarises the calculations of the variations in the net FDI position. 
The net FDI position for the economy as a whole (labelled in row TOTAL in 
Table 2) increased by 35.57% in the period 2005–2009. In the pre-crisis period 
(2005–2007) the growth of foreign capital was 12.85%. Thus, the Spanish 
economy has been attracting foreign capital. Note that Spain, in this model, has 
been split into 22 sectors described in Appendix I. In some of those 22 sectors, 
divestments prevail over FDI inflows received. As a consequence, there was a fall 
in the net FDI position. The magnitude of the decreases is important and, as shown 
in Table 2, they occurred before the crisis (with the exception of “Textiles” and 
“Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation”). However, in six out of the ten 
sectors considered, the crisis exacerbated divestments.  
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Table 2: Changes in the net FDI position in Spain 
 
 
 2005-7% 2005-9% 
Beverages & Tobacco -61.46 -36.46 
Textiles 27.25 -28.39 
Fabricated metal products -5.62 -4.90 
Motor vehicles, trailers & semi-trailers -4.86 -22.51 
Sale & repair of motor vehicles -14.99 -25.87 
Air and water transport -15.36 -32.65 
Telecommunications -18.98 -36.11 
Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 0.95 -3.49 
Renting of machinery & equipment -34.37 -48.97 
Other business activities -22.21 -17.40 
TOTAL  12.85 35.57 
   Source:  The Spanish Registry of FDI (Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness 2013) 
Table 2 includes only the sectors where divestment has taken place. It includes 
all the divestments in the Spanish economy at sectoral level, except for two small 
sectors – the Primary sector and Other manufacturing. Given the small size of 
these two sectors, we do not expect to find important effects for the economy as a 
whole. Thus, our simulations will cover the effects arising from the sectors 
included in Table 2. 
In order to simulate divestments we need to consider some additional 
information. The World Investment Report (UNCTAD 2009) states that between 
one-fourth and one-third of all cross-border mergers and acquisitions involve the 
disposal of foreign affiliates to other firms. The buyer may be a firm based (1) in 
the economy previously hosting the affiliate, (2) in the home economy or (3) in a 
third country. Case 1 results in a reduction of the net FDI position in the host 
economy (i.e., a divestment), whereas cases 2 and 3 do not have any implication 
for the net FDI position (i.e., they are not registered as divestments).  
According to the World Investment Report, in most cases a firm based in the 
host economy buys the affiliate. The next most common case is the purchase from 
a firm based in a third country, and the least frequent case is a purchase from a 
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firm based in the MNE’s home economy. If a national firm buys the plant of a 
foreign affiliate, the plant would continue its operations under a different 
ownership but, usually, experience a reduction in employment. At the other 
extreme, divestments may imply the closure of plants of foreign affiliates, leading 
to more drastic employment outcomes. In our study, we analyse these two types of 
divestment across different sectors of the Spanish economy.  
The Spanish Registry of FDI provides data on the relative importance of 
divestments of MNEs involving the closure of firms versus those divestments that 
ended up in the acquisition of the foreign affiliate by a national firm. There is no 
public information at sectoral level, but only for the economy as a whole. Table 3 
shows that closures account for a smaller share of divestments (the weighted 
average for the period 2005–2011 is 20.3%), while national acquisitions account 
for the reminder. In the present study, we simulate both closures and national 
acquisitions. This provides the two extreme hypotheses between which the impact 
of divestments must be placed. Nevertheless, it seems that the effect is likely to be 
closer to the outcomes derived from national acquisitions.   
 
Table 3: Closures and national acquisitions in divestments in Spain 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average 
Percentages                 
Closures 27.4 9.8 10.1 20.6 35.0 31.2 7.9 20.3 
  Total closure 5.5 1.0 5.7 8.0 5.5 7.1 3.6 5.2 
   Partial closure 21.9 8.8 4.4 12.6 29.5 24.1 4.3 15.1 
National acquisitions 72.6 90.2 89.9 79.4 65.0 68.8 92.1 79.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100.0 
Millions of euros                 
Closures 1790 990 1031 776 738 896 131 907 
  Total closure 358 105 585 301 116 204 60 247 
   Partial closure 1432 885 446 475 622 692 71 660 
National acquisitions 4753 9095 9183 2989 1368 1980 1520 4413 
Total 6543 10085 10214 3765 2106 2876 1651 5320 
Source: The Spanish Registry of FDI (Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness 2013) 
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4 The Model and Simulations  
The model is an extension of Gómez-Plana and Pascual (2011). It adds MNEs 
differentiated from national firms, and also includes FDI changes. It is a static 
computable general equilibrium model describing an open economy, disaggregated 
into 23 productive sectors (see Appendix I), one representative consumer, the 
public sector and a foreign sector representing the rest of the world. The extension 
of the model addresses four factors: (1) the split of each productive sector into two 
parts - one representing the firms owned by residents, and the other foreign-owned 
firms; (2) the modelling of capital use according to specific factor assumptions; (3) 
the definition of the sectors according to the adjustment that will take place after 
the divestments; and (4) the assertion that public sector policies are exogenous to 
focus on effects generated by the private sector.  
The model differs from the existing literature on CGE models with MNEs in 
its way of modelling MNE technologies. Jensen and Tarr (2012) extend previous 
contributions (Jensen et al. 2007; Rutherford and Tarr 2008) to consider a multi-
regional framework. They include a Dixit-Stiglitz-Ethier formulation, which leads 
to potential increases in consumers’ welfare and producers’ productivity through a 
higher number of product varieties (i.e., more firms producing those services, due 
to the arrival of MNEs). However, apart from their use of an imported 
intermediate, MNEs’ technology is the same as that in national firms operating in 
the same sector.  
Lakatos and Fukui (2013) have built a multiregional CGE model with MNEs. 
They have also constructed a database on foreign affiliates’ sales for the whole 
world with high sectoral detail (Fukui and Lakatos 2012)1. The differentiation of 
the technologies of MNEs and national firms within each sector in the CGE is 
based on the MNEs’ shares in sales and on a proxy for differences in capital-
labour ratios for the two types of firm. Lakatos and Fukui (2013) do not 
differentiate the value added provided by both types of firm which is assumed to 
be proportional to sales, so that they introduce a further degree of symmetry 
_________________________ 
1 In our view, the main contribution of this database is that it provides information on the sales of 
MNEs in many countries and sectors for which formerly there was no information at all.  
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between national firms and MNEs. We use the real shares on value added and 
production, which enable us to identify differences in productivity. 
These recent CGE approaches reflect a trade-off between expanding a model’s 
regional coverage and differentiating technologies of national firms and MNEs 
across sectors. Further, these models capture the impact of MNEs by relying on 
barriers to FDI in order to make FDI movements endogenous. Those barriers are 
difficult to estimate empirically. By contrast, in our model, we use real data on the 
variations of the FDI net position across sectors and derive their impact. 
Finally, it must be noted that due to the high unemployment rate in the Spanish 
economy, instead of using the common assumption of full employment in the 
labour market, the model includes unemployment in a way derived from trade 
union models. Next we present a brief description of the model. The full set of 
equations is given in Appendix II. 
4.1 Equilibrium Conditions 
The equilibrium of the model is a set of prices and allocation of goods and factors. 
It involves the simultaneous solution of three sets of equations: 
• Zero-profit conditions. 
• Market clearing in goods and capital markets. 
• Constraints on disposable income (total revenue must equal total 
expenditure), labour market (includes unemployment) and macroeconomic 
closure of the model. 
4.2 Production 
Production is based on a technology characterized by a nested structure of 
intermediate inputs, capital and labour. The firms’ problem is to maximise profits 
subject to technology constraints, obtaining the unit cost functions, which are 
further used in the zero-profit conditions. In turn, the demand for factors and 
intermediate inputs are obtained from Shepard’s lemma on cost functions, and then 
used in the market-clearing equations.  
Firms show constant returns to scale in their technologies and fix a competitive 
pricing rule, with free entry and exit of firms. However, note that within each 
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sector there are two different varieties of the same good: a national variety 
produced by national firms and a foreign one produced by MNEs. The price of 
these two varieties can differ because their costs of production vary between 
national firms and MNEs of the same sector. Thus, we abandon the assumption of 
equal costs of production for national firms and MNEs across sectors, which is 
present in most of the CGEs including MNEs (see Latorre 2009 and 2010). This 
equal costs assumption arises because only the percentage of capital owned by 
MNEs is used to split the sectors into a national firms' part and another MNEs' 
part. Thus, the input mix is the same between both types of firm within the same 
sector. By contrast, in our model, we split sectors into two parts, using Eurostat's 
information on the shares of production, labour and capital that MNEs and 
national firms own (see Section 4.8). As a result, the cost structure differs between 
national firms and MNEs in each sector.  
4.3 Consumption 
There is a representative consumer household behaving as a rational consumer. 
The level of consumer welfare is determined by the endowments of capital and 
labour jointly with exogenous net transfers paid by the public sector. The fixed 
endowment of labour should be interpreted as a maximum supply, since leisure 
and unemployment are assumed to be endogenous. Hence, labour supply would be 
elastic up to the endowment constraint. 
The problem of household decisions consists of choosing an optimal 
consumption bundle, by maximising a nested utility function subject to budget 
constraint. Preferences are represented by a nested utility function on 
(consumption of) goods, leisure and savings. Notice that, given our static 
approach, we assume a unitary elasticity of substitution between savings and 
(consumption of) goods (Howe 1975), so that savings can be interpreted as the 
purchase of bonds for future consumption.  
The budget constraint includes total factor rents jointly with exogenous net 
transfers paid by the public sector. Demand functions for goods, leisure and 
savings are derived from the first-order conditions, and are included in the 
equations for goods and factor markets, as well as in the macroeconomic closure 
for savings.  
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4.4 Public Sector 
The role of the public sector in the model is twofold, i.e., owner of resources (e.g. 
from capital endowment and tax revenue), and purchaser of certain goods. As a 
resource owner, its wealth includes income from capital rents, net transfers paid to 
the representative household, and tax revenues. Taxes consist of social 
contributions paid by employers and employees, value added taxes, other net 
indirect taxes, and income taxes. All taxes are modelled as effective ad valorem 
rates calibrated from benchmark data, except for income taxes that are exogenous. 
In order to isolate any bias from the public sector on the results, ad valorem 
indirect tax rates are allowed to change endogenously under the equal yield 
assumption. 
Capital rents for the public sector, by definition (see Eurostat 1996), include 
the fixed capital consumption because net operating surplus is zero for the public 
sector. The fixed capital consumption has been assigned to two sectors: “Public 
services” and “Other services”. All the capital in “Public services” is owned by the 
public sector, whereas in “Other services” it is partly publicly owned and partly 
private. 
The public sector also enters the model as a purchaser. Public sector 
expenditure includes both market (i.e., output that is disposed of in the market at 
economically significant prices) and non-market goods (i.e., output that is 
provided at prices that are not economically significant). 
4.5 Foreign Sector 
The model incorporates the small open economy assumption. It means that the 
country faces a perfectly elastic export supply function. In addition, there is a 
constant elasticity of transformation function between domestic and foreign sales. 
Regarding imports, we assume that goods are differentiated according to their 
origin (i.e., domestic or foreign), following Armington’s assumption (Armington 
1969), which allows for the possibility of intra-industry trade despite the 
assumption of exogenous world prices. 
The foreign sector is closed by assuming that the difference between receipts 
and payments from the rest of the world is exogenous. This constraint would 
prevent, for example, a permanent increase in exports with no change in imports, 
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an unlikely scenario since it would involve an unlimited capital outflow from the 
country. Nevertheless, it forces a matching movement in trade flows. 
4.6 Factor markets 
Two factors are incorporated into the model: capital and labour. With respect to 
capital, both the representative household and the public sector own fixed 
endowments. The capital rents adjust to clear the domestic capital market, under 
the assumptions of capital international immobility (except for the divestments, 
which have been modelled as exogenously driven), and no mobility across 
domestic sectors. Hence the capital is specific at two levels: (1) each sector 
employs only specific capital, and (2) capital is differentiated according to 
ownership (i.e., public, private national and foreign). 
The only owner of labour is the representative household. The demand for 
leisure is derived from the household’s optimisation problem. Hence, labour 
supply (i.e., labour endowment minus the demand for leisure) would be elastic up 
to the fixed amount of labour. We assume that labour is internationally immobile, 
but mobile within the country. 
We also assume that workers have some market power and their wage 
demands are related to unemployment level in the economy (Kehoe et al. 1995). 
For that reason the model includes the following constraint: 
β
1
1
1






−
−
=
u
uw
 
where w represents real wages, u is the unemployment rate at the benchmark 
value, and β is a parameter that measures real wage flexibility with respect to the 
unemployment rate. Hence, when β approaches infinity, the real wage approaches 
its benchmark value (which is 1 according to the calibration process explained 
below). This is the case for rigid real wages when wages do not change when 
unemployment does. If β approaches zero, the unemployment rate approaches the 
benchmark unemployment rate, with real wages being flexible. Intermediate 
values for β show different flexibility levels of real wages to the unemployment 
rate.  
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4.7 Macroeconomic Closure 
Total investment is split into sectoral gross capital formation using a fixed-
coefficients Leontief structure (Dervis et al. 1981). Notice that, in our static 
framework, total gross capital formation shows its influence on the economy as a 
component of final demand. The model embodies a macroeconomic closure 
equation stating that investment and savings (private, public and foreign) are 
equal.  
Finally, the model is solved as explained in Rutherford (1999), with the 
general equilibrium model defined as a mixed complementarity problem (see 
Mathiesen 1985). The software employed is GAMS/MPSGE.  
4.8 Calibration and Data 
The model has been calibrated with Spanish data. The calibration method is based 
on a benchmark equilibrium corresponding to the National Accounts and a set of 
exogenous parameters. A detailed explanation for the calibration method can be 
found in Mansur and Whalley (1984) and Dawkins et al. (2001). 
To build the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) we rely on the 2005 Input-
Output symmetric table, the most recent available for the Spanish economy. We 
also use information on the institutional sector accounts from the Spanish Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística (INE 2013b). Public revenue data have been disaggregated 
for indirect taxation, and social security contributions. The sector disaggregation in 
the SAM includes2 first the ten sectors that register divestments (see Table 2). 
Another set of sectors has been chosen for their upstream and downstream 
linkages with the ten disinvesting sectors. And there are two other aggregate 
sectors, (“Other industries” and “Other services”), which cover the remaining 
sectors. 
Elasticities play a key role in the model (see sensitivity analysis in Section 6). 
The benchmark values for those elasticities are: 
• Elasticities of substitution in the welfare function 
— between consumption and savings (σCA): 1 
_________________________ 
2 The Input-Output table has 72 sectors aggregated into 23 sectors. See Appendix I. 
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— between final consumption and leisure (σCO): 1 
— among final consumption goods (σBC): 1 
• Elasticities related to production 
— between intermediate inputs and value added composite (σI): 0 
— between labour and capital (σLK): values fluctuate between 0.20 and 1.68 
— between domestic and foreign goods (Armington elasticities): values 
fluctuate between 1.25 and 4.05 
— between goods sold in the domestic market and abroad (elasticities of 
transformation): values fluctuate between 0.70 and 3.90 
The literature sources for the elasticities are Narayanan and Walmsley (2008) 
for σLK and σA; the elasticities of transformation from De Melo and Tarr (1992); 
and σCO is consistent with the survey by Ballard and Kang (2003). The remaining 
values are widely found in the literature. 
The sectoral data (on production, employment and factor rents) are split 
between national firms and MNEs. Most of the information for those shares comes 
from Eurostat (2013), with few exceptions. Data on the financial sector come from 
the Bank of Spain (2006a) and Asociación Española de Banca (2006). As there are 
no data on the construction sector for 2005, we use data for 2008, the first 
available year in Eurostat (2013). Data on agriculture come from the SABI (2012) 
database.  
4.9 Simulations 
Two broad types of simulation are run. First, a set of simulations investigates the 
impact of divestments, leading to the closure of foreign firms (“Closure” 
hypothesis). The closure (total and partial) is represented as a decrease in sectoral 
capital stock owned by foreigners in Spain. Second, other simulations consider the 
effects of the acquisition of foreign plant by national firms (“National acquisition” 
hypothesis). The sales to national firms involve a change in ownership and the 
capital moves from foreign to national firms.  
National acquisitions are more common and account for approximately 80% of 
the divestments (Table 3). However, we do not know the distribution of closures 
and national acquisitions at sectoral level. Thus, we will simulate the two extreme 
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scenarios to establish the range for these results. The values of divestments, in real 
terms, cover the period 2005–2009 (Table 2). 
For the “National acquisition” scenario one question arises in a general 
equilibrium framework: how did Spanish firms finance the purchase of foreign 
affiliates? To the best of our knowledge, there is no accurate information on this 
issue. We know, however, that since 2003 most Spanish MNEs that acquired other 
firms abroad did so through loans (Bank of Spain, 2011). In those years credit was 
easily available at very low interes t rates. INE (2013b) data show that non-
financial firms became increasingly indebted from 2003 to 2007, while the pace of 
indebtedness was reduced but still present in 2008–2009. Further, the Bank of 
Spain (2006b) and the European Central Bank (2006) confirm that for that period 
much of the demand for credit was related to mergers, acquisitions and firms’ 
restructuring. It seems reasonable, therefore, to assume that national firms were 
given loans in order to purchase the foreign affiliates located in Spain. This is 
taken into account in the simulations. 
5 Results 
The scenarios “Closure” and “National acquisition” are presented for two cases: 
(1) the general equilibrium effects of simultaneous divestments in the ten sectors 
where divestment takes place – labelled “All divestments” for both scenarios 
(Section 5.1). (2) the general equilibrium effects of divestment in individual 
sectors, discussed for each of the ten sectors where divestment takes place (Section 
5.2). Both cases reproduce the divestments actually experienced in Spain between 
2005 and 2009. Due to the static character of our model, the results should be 
viewed as short/medium-run outcomes. 
5.1 The impact of the Simultaneous Divestments in All Divesting 
Sectors  
Figure 1 summarises the main findings for our two extreme hypotheses (“Closure” 
and “National acquisition”). With respect to “Closure”, foreign capital leaves the 
country and workers in foreign affiliates are dismissed. Around 1.5% of the total 
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employment in the economy disappears. The unemployment rate rises by 11% 
(i.e., from its level in 2005, 9.16%, to 10.16%). As labour demand decreases, real 
wage falls. The lower labour demand (and employment) also brings about lower 
capital demand. This lower capital demand, together with the fall in capital supply 
(i.e., of the amount of divestment), generates a smaller reduction in the 
remuneration of capital than that in wages: 0.13% (rental rate of capital is a 
sectoral weighted average, given the capital specific assumption). 
The fall in the factors employed in production and their lower remunerations 
result in a decrease in both GDP and welfare (measured as Hicksian equivalent 
variations) of 1.45% and 1.70%, respectively. Since the level of activity 
diminishes due to the closure of plants, foreign trade shrinks as well. 
Next we analyse the scenario where all the former foreign plants end up in the 
hands of national firms (“National acquisition”). Under this hypothesis, the 
unemployment rate will decrease by 3.55% (from 9.16% to 8.83%). Total 
employment in the economy rises by 1%. Capital is now used in national firms, 
whose technology is slightly more labour intensive in aggregate than that in the 
MNEs (see Figure 2 for sectoral detail). The general increase in labour generates a 
Stolper-Samuelson-theorem effect on factor rents: an increase in wages with  
 
Figure 1: Simulations results: effects of all divestments 
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Figure 2: Labour intensity (L/K ratio) across the ten sectors with divestments 
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Table 4: Simulations results: effects of “Closures” across sectors 
 Employment Unemployment Wage Rental rate of capital GDP Welfare Imports Exports 
Beverages & Tobacco -0.17 1.22 -0.08 -0.06 -0.12 -0.18 -0.20 -0.20 
Textiles -0.02 0.14 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
Fabricated metal products 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
Motor vehicles, trailers & semi-trailers -0.46 2.96 -0.20 0.14 -0.35 -0.42 -1.96 -1.96 
Sale & repair of motor vehicles  -0.16 1.41 -0.09 -0.07 -0.23 -0.25 -0.45 -0.45 
Air and water transport  -0.01 0.22 -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 -0.11 -0.10 -0.10 
Telecommunications -0.36 2.85 -0.19 -0.12 -0.41 -0.43 -0.51 -0.51 
Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 0.06 -0.17 0.01 -0.12 -0.02 -0.15 -0.14 -0.14 
Renting of machinery & equipment  -0.13 1.34 -0.09 -0.13 -0.23 -0.39 -0.25 -0.25 
Other business activities -0.11 0.94 -0.06 -0.08 -0.14 -0.34 -0.19 -0.19 
All Divestments (closures) -1.49 11.00 -0.74 -0.13 -1.45 -1.70 -3.16 -3.16 
Table 5: Simulations results: effects of “National acquisition” across sectors 
 Employment Unemployment Wage Rental rateof capital GDP Welfare Imports Exports 
Beverages & Tobacco 0.00 0.11 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.00 
Textiles 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Fabricated metal products 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Motor vehicles, trailers & semi-trailers -0.21 1.48 -0.10 -0.08 -0.19 -0.25 -1.25 -1.25 
Sale & repair of motor vehicles  1.04 -4.78 0.32 -1.04 0.26 -0.86 -0.35 -0.35 
Air and water transport  0.54 -1.61 0.11 -0.99 -0.11 -1.22 -1.08 -1.08 
Telecommunications 0.38 -0.46 0.03 -1.06 -0.27 -1.37 -1.28 -1.28 
Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 0.61 -1.94 0.13 -1.05 -0.09 -1.28 -1.13 -1.13 
Renting of machinery & equipment  0.71 -2.39 0.16 -1.18 -0.07 -1.27 -1.12 -1.12 
Other business activities 0.39 -0.58 0.04 -1.02 -0.23 -1.48 -1.20 -1.20 
All divestments (national acquisitions) 1.00 -3.55 0.24 -1.55 -0.03 -1.40 -1.64 -1.64 
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5.2.1 Sectoral Closures 
The sectoral analysis identifies the different magnitudes of the outcomes according 
to the sector in which the shock takes place. We also check whether all sectors 
follow the trend described above in the “All divestments” simulations. Note that 
the last row in Table 4 gives the results also used in Figure 1, to aid comparison. 
The variables are those considered in the previous section. 
The biggest reductions in employment are observed after the closure of plants 
in “Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers” (Motor vehicles, henceforth) and in 
“Telecommunications”, with reductions of 0.46% and 0.36% in total employment, 
respectively. The most sizeable increases in the unemployment rate occur after the 
shock in those two sectors. However, there is a fall in the rental rate of capital in 
Telecommunications (0.12%), but an increase for Motor vehicles (0.14%) (Note 
that Telecommunications is more capital intensive, Figure 2). This implies that the 
fall in GDP and welfare are the largest after the closures in Telecommunications 
(0.41% and 0.43%, respectively). The next most harmful effects arise after 
closures in Motor vehicles (0.35% in GDP and 0.42% in welfare). The fall in 
foreign trade is greatest after the shock in the latter sector, characterised by the 
international openness of its activities. 
Although differing in magnitudes, all sectors follow the trend described earlier 
when analysing the “Closure” hypothesis in “All divestments”. Only “Activities 
auxiliary to financial intermediation” have different outcomes for employment, 
unemployment and wages. This is related to the fact that the amount of labour 
affected in the shock in this sector is much smaller than that affected after the 
shock in the other sectors. It is easier to reallocate a smaller quantity of labour 
throughout the economy, so adjustment costs are lower.  
In general, the differences in the magnitude of the impact of closures across 
sectors are related to the amount of capital involved in the shock. This is a 
combination of the weight of MNEs in the capital stock of the sector, as well as 
how labour intensive they are, together with the magnitude of the decrease in the 
net FDI position.  
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5.2.2 National acquisitions across sectors 
Telecommunications is also the sector to undergo the most adverse effects on GDP 
when national acquisitions take place (Table 5). There is still a fall in GDP, 
although smaller than in the case of closures (0.27% versus 0.41%). In fact, 
national acquisitions in most sectors result in small GDP decreases. After 
Telecommunications, the next largest falls come from “Other business activities” 
and Motor vehicles. In most cases, national acquisitions increase employment and 
wages and reduce unemployment. This trend should be familiar, since we also 
observe it in “All divestments” (“National acquisition” hypothesis), shown in the 
last row of Table 5. However, it is the fall in the real rental rate of capital which 
brings about the negative results in GDP. Note that with the national acquisitions 
the remuneration of capital falls by more than in the case of closures (as reported 
in Table 4). In the case of “closures” capital becomes less abundant in the country, 
while with national acquisitions the total stock of capital remains fixed (although 
there is a change in ownership). These forces meant that capital will be relatively 
more expensive when it becomes less abundant (i.e., “closure” case). Further, the 
reduction in the rental rate of capital after national acquisitions in the short run is 
supported by empirical evidence. Anand et al. (2005) argue that firms experience 
difficulties in their post-acquisition performance, further stressing that wider 
geographic scope in post-acquisition would be helpful. Note that the “National 
acquisition” case would commonly reduce the geographic scope of the activities of 
the firm, compared to the previous case where the plant was part of an MNE. 
Hennart (2009: 1445) also explains that there is a cost in managing integration, 
which provides a rationale for the national acquisition losses. 
For manufacturing sectors the outcome of the higher level of activity in 
national firms is that the fall in foreign trade is smaller than in the case of closures. 
However, for services, when more activities are undertaken in national firms, the 
fall in foreign trade is larger than in the case of closures. More activity in national 
firms in services contracts foreign trade. 
National acquisitions in Motor vehicles exhibit a different pattern because it is 
relatively labour intensive. The same phenomenon (i.e., MNEs being even more 
labour intensive than national firms) occurs in “Other business”. However, the 
latter sector accounts for an important part of consumption and is therefore 
simultaneously linked to the demand side of the economy. Thus, costs are not very 
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important for changes in this sector. Changes in costs are important for the 
development of “Sale and repair of motor vehicles” and, to a lesser extent, of 
“Renting of machinery and equipment”. MNEs in the former sector are very 
capital intensive compared with national firms. When foreign capital leaves, 
capital is invested in national acquisitions, where it generates a boom in 
employment, leading to a decrease in unemployment. “Sale and repair of motor 
vehicles” is the only sector in which national acquisitions bring about a GDP 
increase. In agreement with previous results derived from the arrival of MNEs 
(Latorre et al. 2009; Latorre 2013), these sectoral differences in the impact of 
“National acquisition” indicate that cost structures are important to explain the 
outcomes.  
6 Sensitivity Analysis 
A sensitivity analysis on model elasticities for all scenarios has been performed. 
Table 6 shows the results for a selected group of macroeconomic variables focused 
on labour market effects: employment, unemployment rate and wages. These 
variables can be considered a good example of the sensitivity of the results to the 
whole set of elasticities. The results relate to the scenario “All divestments” for the 
two types of change in capital stock: “National acquisitions” and “Closures”. The 
full set of results for the remaining microeconomic and macroeconomic variables 
and scenarios has been omitted here and can be requested from the authors. 
The sensitivity analysis focuses on the elasticities related to the welfare and 
production functions. The baseline scenario “All divestments” for “National 
acquisitions” and “Closures” is shown in the first line in Table 6. The benchmark 
elasticities have been duplicated and halved, except for the Armington elasticities3 
(where a more competitive international framework has been tested) and β (where 
very rigid and flexible wage scenarios have been tested). 
_________________________ 
3 Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) review the literature on the Armington elasticities and find 
values between 5 and 10 more plausible than the lower GTAP estimates used in this paper. The 
sensitivity analysis adopts an intermediate value of 7.5 for all sectors. 
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Table 6: Sensitivity analysis 
 National Acquisitions  Closures  
  
Employment Unemployment 
rate 
Wages Employment Unemployment 
rate 
Wages 
Base: All divestments 1.00 -3.55 0.24 -1.49 11.00 -0.74 
Elasticity of substitution between savings and consumption (σCA = 1)       
          σ’CA = 2 0.99 -3.60 0.24 -1.50 10.99 -0.74 
          σ’CA = 0.5 1.00 -3.52 0.24 -1.48 11.00 -0.74 
Elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure (σCO = 1)       
          σ’CO = 2 0.89 -6.37 0.43 -1.74 8.08 -0.54 
          σ’CO = 0.5 1.06 -1.87 0.13 -1.34 12.62 -0.85 
Elasticity of substitution among consumption godos (σBC = 1)       
          σ’BC = 2 1.09 -3.47 0.23 -1.64 12.25 -0.82 
          σ’BC = 0.5 1.00 -3.67 0.25 -1.28 9.53 -0.64 
Elasticity of substitution between labour and capital (σLK = Narayanan and 
Walmsley, 2008)       
          σ’LK = σLK  * 2 0.99 -3.43 0.23 -1.75 12.53 -0.84 
          σ’LK = σLK * 0.5 1.00 -3.55 0.24 -1.27 9.79 -0.66 
Armington trade elasticity (σ’A = Narayanan and Walmsley, 2008)       
          σ’A = 7.5 0.25 -1.35 0.09 -0.67 5.36 -0.36 
Real wage flexibility with respect to the unemployment rate (β = 1.5)       
          β’  = 0.001 0.71 -0.01 0.56 -0.38 0.01    -1.35 
          β’ = 20 1.18 -5.85 0.03 -2.62    22.18    -0.11 
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With respect to “National acquisitions”, the shocks in the elasticity of 
substitution between aggregate consumption and savings hardly affect the results. 
The change in the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure 
affects the labour supply and, logically, this is reflected in employment, 
unemployment rate and wages. A higher (lower) elasticity of substitution 
consumption-leisure exacerbates (dampens) the changes in those variables. 
Differences are in quantitative terms, but not in signs. The elasticity of substitution 
among consumption goods has a small effect on labour market variables. The 
elasticity of substitution capital-labour affects the capital and labour demands. 
Nevertheless, the labour market variables are not significantly affected. The higher 
Armington elasticity indicates that more competitive goods markets temper 
adjustments in the labour market. Finally, a lower β parameter (i.e., a very flexible 
wage scenario) and a higher β (i.e., a very rigid wage scenario) show the expected 
results: a lower (higher) β generates a lower (higher) change in employment and 
unemployment and higher (lower) wage adjustment. 
The “Closures” simulations follow a similar pattern to the previous “National 
acquisitions” case. Although signs with respect to the baseline case are maintained 
in all the cases given in Table 6, it shows a slightly higher effect in quantitative 
terms. This can be explained because of the fall in capital endowments. With a 
smaller amount of capital, effects on the other factor (labour) should be stronger. 
7 Concluding Remarks 
The FDI inflows received in the Spanish economy outweighed the amount of total 
divestments (i.e., reductions in the net FDI inward position) in the period 2005–
2009. However, in some particular sectors, MNEs’ divestments surpassed their 
investments.  
In this paper, we first work on the data available to estimate the magnitude of 
sectoral divestments in an attempt to isolate those that lead to a reduction in 
production and employment in MNEs. We find these to be sizeable in some 
Spanish sectors. In order to analyse the effects of these divestments, we develop a 
CGE model which considers the presence of both MNEs and unemployment. As 
far as we know, there is no other study using a CGE model with unemployment 
and MNEs. We estimate the economy-wide impact of divestments, presenting 
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results for total employment, the rate of unemployment, real wages, capital 
remunerations, GDP, welfare and foreign trade. 
Fortunately for the Spanish economy, foreign divestments have not always 
resulted in the closure of plants but in the acquisition of foreign plants by national 
firms. The World Investment Report published by UNCTAD shows that this 
predominance of national acquisitions is a general trend across countries. We pay 
close attention to this matter by estimating two different hypotheses (“Closure” 
versus “National acquisitions”). The real outcome should be between these two 
extreme cases. 
Taking into account all simultaneous divestments in the ten sectors where they 
have concentrated between 2005 and 2009, we obtain the following main 
outcomes for the short and medium run. For “Closures”, the unemployment rate 
would increase from 9.16% (its 2005 level) to 10.16%, and GDP would decrease 
by –1.45%. In the case of “National acquisitions”, the unemployment rate would 
be reduced from 9.16% to 8.83%, and GDP would remain approximately at its 
initial level. This suggests that “Closures” would only have accounted for a very 
small share of the huge increase in unemployment that Spain has recently 
experienced (from 8.4% in 2005 to 26% in 2012), even though they could have 
been more important to explain the fall in GDP in 2009 (–3.7%) and 2010 (–0.3%).   
We also analyse the differential impact of divestments at sectoral level. The 
shocks are asymmetric insofar as they simulate the real magnitudes of sectoral 
divestments for the period 2005–2009. We analyse the impact in both 
manufacturing and service sectors. In the “Closure” scenario, divestments in 
“Telecommunications” and “Motor vehicles” would bring about the most 
substantial increases in the unemployment rate and decreases in GDP. For 
“National acquisition”, the greatest reductions in unemployment would occur in 
“Sale and repair of motor vehicles”, “Renting of machinery and equipment”, 
“Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation” and “Air and water transport”. 
Regarding GDP outcomes (in the “National acquisition” case) only “Sale and 
repair of motor vehicles” yields an increase in GDP, while it is slightly reduced in 
the other nine sectors. For most sectors, the different outcomes of divestments are 
related to the contrasting cost structures of MNEs across sectors.  
It could be expected a priori that national acquisitions of foreign MNEs would 
benefit the host economy. Our analysis shows that this is the case in terms of 
unemployment reductions and employment creation. However, due to the impact 
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of national acquisitions on capital remuneration (i.e., on firms’ profits), welfare 
tends to diminish in the host economy. Additionally, GDP could also fall in some 
cases. In this sense, our results contrast with the optimistic view of divestments 
presented by Myro et al. (2008) based on econometric estimations for the years of 
the construction boom in Spain. While we cover the final years of the construction 
boom and the beginning of the crisis, we share those authors’ view that the scope 
of the phenomenon is rather limited, but we find more potential for damaging 
impacts. Sectoral divestments clearly have a considerable negative effect on the 
Spanish economy when they take the form of closures. They also have some 
harmful effects (decrease in welfare and GDP), as well as positive outcomes on 
employment creation and unemployment reduction, in the case of national 
acquisitions. 
This paper provides detailed quantitative estimations of the processes related 
to divestments that could be helpful to the implementation of compensating policy 
options.  
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Appendix I: Sectors in the model and their correspondences with different sectoral classifications. 
 
 Spanish Input-output Table (2005) NACE Rev. 1 Nace Rev.2 
Primary goods 1,2,3 01,02,05 01,02,03 
Energy 8,9,10 23,04 19,35 
Food products 12,13,14 15 (except 159) 10 
Beverages & Tobacco 15,16 159,16 11,12 
Textiles products 17,18,19 17,18,19 13,14,15 
Chemical products 23,24 24,25 20,21,22 
Basic metals 29,31 27,29 24,28 
Manufacture of metal products 30 28 25 
Motor vehicles, trailers & semi-trailers 36 34 29,3311,3315,3316,3317 
Other industries 4,5,6,7,11,20,21,22,25,26,27,28, 
32, 33,34,35,37,38,39 
10,11,12,13,14,41,36,20,21,22, 
26,30,31,32,33,25,36,37 
05,06,07,08,09,36,16,17, 
18,23,26,27,30,31 
Contruction 40 45 41,42,43 
Sale & repair of motor vehicles and automotive fuel 41 50 45 
Wholesale and retail trade 42,43 51,52 46,47,95 
Air and water transport  48,49 61,62 50,51 
Other transport 46,47,50,51 60,63 49,52,79 
Post and telecommunications 52 64 53,61 
Financial intermediation 53,54 65,66 64,65 
Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 55 67 66 
Real estate activities 56 70 68 
Renting of machinery & equipment  57 71 77 
Other business activities 60 74 69,70,71,73,74,78,80,81,82 
Other services 44,45,58,59,61,62,63,64,65,66,71,72 55,56,72,73,80,85,90,91,92,93 55,56,58,62,63,72,85,75,86,87,88, 
37,38, 39,94,59,60,90,91,92,93,96 
Public services 67,68,69,70 75,80,85,90 84,97 
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Appendix II: Model equations 
 
As general rule, the notation in the model is as follows: endogenous variables are denoted by 
capital letters, exogenous variables by capital letters with a bar, and parameters by small Latin 
and Greek letters. There are 23 (i, j = 1,…, 23) production sectors and each sector produces 
one good. The model’s equations are as follows, and variables and parameters are listed 
below. 
 
A. 1. Production 
The nested technology presents constant returns to scale and a competitive pricing rule. Given 
that the top nest is a Leontief function, the zero-profit condition for domestic firms and MNEs 
in sector i are, respectively: 
 
  
(i = 1,…, 23)     (A1) 
 
 (i = 1,…, 22)     (A2) 
 
where, according to the nested structure, the unitary cost of the value added composite 
generated by sector i is a CES function: 
 
(i = 1,…, 21)      (A3) 
 
 (i = 1,…, 21)       (A4) 
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(i = 22)       (A5) 
 
(i = 22)        (A6) 
 
    
(i = 23)        (A7) 
 
There is imperfect substitution between production made by domestic firms and MNEs. This 
is modelled through an Armington aggregate: 
 
 
(i=1,…,22)  (A8) 
 
We assume that firms maximize profits, and choose the optimal mix of national and imported 
goods, and that of domestic sales and exports. This leads to the next zero profit conditions: 
            
(i = 1,…, 23)     (A9) 
 
       
(i=1,…,23)      (A10) 
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These zero profit conditions are used to get derived demand functions, by applying the 
Shepard’s Lemma on cost functions. 
 
Next, we introduce the corresponding market clearing equations, with demands and supplies 
showing in the left-hand and the right-hand side, respectively: 
 
 
(i, j  = 1,…, 23)              (A11) 
 
   (i = 1,…, 23)     (A12) 
 
 
(i = 1,…, 22)      (A13) 
 
  (i = 22, 23)       (A14) 
 
(A15) 
 
  
(i = 1,…, 23)     (A16) 
 
  
(i = 1,…, 22)     (A17) 
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   (i = 1,…, 23)     (A18) 
 
   (i = 1,…, 23)     (A19) 
 
   (i = 1,…, 23)     (A20) 
 
   (i = 1,…, 23)     (A21) 
 
   (i = 1,…, 23)     (A22) 
 
   (i = 1,…, 23)     (A23) 
 
    (i = 1,…, 23)     (A24) 
 
A. 2. Consumption 
The final demand functions are derived from the maximization of the representative 
consumer’s nested welfare function:  
     (A25) 
 
subject to the budget constraints: 
 
 (A26) 
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                 (A27) 
 
where: 
 
 
 
The nests in the welfare function are defined by:  
 
     (A28) 
        (A29) 
 
Consumption goods are purchased by the representative consumer and the public sector: 
  (i = 1,…, 23)       (A30) 
 
The solution to the maximization problem yields the demand functions for savings, leisure, 
and final demand. 
 
A. 3. Public Sector 
The income of the public sector is given by: 
    (A31) 
 
where revenues come from several taxes: 
 
(i = 1,…, 23)   (A32) 
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(i = 1,…, 23)   (A33) 
 
 
The macro closure rule is:  
   (A34) 
 
where: 
 
 
 
A. 4. Foreign sector, investment and savings 
The macro closure of the model involves some other constraints related to investment and 
savings in this open economy:  
 
   (A35) 
 
  (A36) 
A. 5. Factor Markets 
The equilibrium in the capital market is given in (A6), and the equilibrium in the labour 
market in (A7), with some restrictions related to the unemployment assumptions:  
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 (A37) 
 
    (A38) 
 
Table A1. Endogenous Variables 
 
Symbol Definition 
  Ai Armington aggregate (total amount of goods supplied) of 
sector i 
 CPI Consumer Price Index 
 CUR Factor of conversion of foreign currency into domestic 
currency 
 EXPi Exports of sector i 
 FCi Final domestic consumption of goods produced by sector i 
RC
iFC  Final private consumption of goods produced by sector i 
PUB
iFC  Final public consumption of goods produced by sector i 
 Ii Investment (gross capital formation) in goods produced by 
sector i 
 IIij Intermediate inputs from sector j used by sector i 
IMPi Imports from sector i 
ITi  Indirect taxes revenue in sector i 
Oi Production of sector i sold in the domestic market 
Psav Savings shadow price 
PAi Unit cost of the Armington aggregate of sector i 
 POi Unit cost of the production of sector i sold in the domestic 
market  
PRIVSAV Private savings 
A
iPROFIT  Unit profits for Ai (according to origin) 
CET
iPROFIT  Unit profits for Ai (according to destination) 
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X
iPROFIT  Unit profits for Xi 
DOMX
iPROFIT
_  Unit profits for X_DOMi 
MNEX
iPROFIT
_  Unit profits for X_MNEi 
 PUBSAV Public savings 
MNEX
i
DOMX
i
PVA
PVA
_
_ ,
 
Unit cost of primary inputs used by domestic and MNEs 
firms in sector i 
 PXi Price of the goods produced by sector i 
iDOMPX _  Price of the goods produced by domestic firms in sector i 
iMNEPX _  Price of the goods produced by MNEs in sector i 
 Qc Demand for aggregate consumption 
 Qcg Demand for aggregate consumption of goods 
 Ql Demand for leisure 
pub
sav
priv
sav QQ ,  Private and Public demand for savings  
 R_DOMi,R_MNEi 
R_PUBi 
Capital rental rates in sector i 
SOCi Revenue from social contributions paid by employers and 
employees of sector i 
TAU Endogenous multiplier for revenue neutrality 
U Unemployment rate  
W Wages 
WF Welfare 
Xi,X_DOMi, 
X_MNEi 
Production of sector i 
YRC Disposable income of the representative consumer 
YPUB Disposable income of the public sector 
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Table A2. Exogenous Variables and Parameters 
 
Symbol Definition 
FORSAV  Foreign savings  
MNERC
i
DOMRC
i KK
__ ,
 
Capital endowment of the representative consumer to produce 
good i 
PUB
iK  
Capital endowment of the public sector to produce good i 
L  Labour endowment 
NTPS  Net transfers from the representative consumer to the public sector 
PFX  World prices 
iPO  Benchmark Prices 
0U  Benchmark Unemployment rate 
a_domi,a_mnei, aa_domi, 
axi, b, c_dom0i, c_mne0i, 
c_domji c_mneji, di, ei 
Share parameters  
FC
i
GKF
i
II
i ititit ,,  Indirect taxes rates, ad valorem, in sector i, that burden intermediate inputs, investment and final consumption, 
respectively  
soci Social contributions rates, ad valorem, paid in sector i 
ii mnedom _,_ αα
  
Scale parameters 
β Sensibility parameter real wages-unemployment rate 
 Elasticity of transformation in sector i 
θi Share parameters 
 Armington elasticity of substitution in sector i 
 Elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure 
 Elasticity of substitution between labour and capital in sector i 
τi, τ
sav Share parameters   
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